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The authors conducted an experience sampling study to investigate the relationship between momentary
ruminative self-focus and negative affect. Ninety-three adults recorded these variables at quasi-random
intervals 8 times daily for 1 week. Scores on questionnaire measures of dispositional rumination were
associated with mean levels of momentary ruminative self-focus over the experience sampling week.
Concurrently, momentary ruminative self-focus was positively associated with negative affect. Cross-
lagged analyses revealed that whereas ruminative self-focus predicted negative affect at a subsequent
occasion, negative affect also predicted ruminative self-focus at a subsequent occasion. Decomposition
of the dispositional rumination measure suggested that brooding, but not reflective pondering, was
associated with higher mean levels of negative affect. Though broadly consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s
(1991) response styles theory, these results suggest that a reciprocal relationship exists between rumi-
native self-focus and negative affect.
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The response styles theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991,
2000) posits that rumination is an important vulnerability factor for
the onset and maintenance of depression. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991,
p. 569) defines rumination as a response style characterized by
“repetitively focusing on the fact that one is depressed; on one’s
symptoms of depression; and on the causes, meanings, and con-
sequences of depressive symptoms.” Within RST, the tendency to
adopt a ruminative style in response to depressed mood is pro-
posed to be an individual difference that is stable across time.
Consistent with the hypothesis that rumination contributes to the
onset and maintenance of depression, longitudinal prospective
studies have found that, controlling for initial levels of depression,
a ruminative response style predicts the onset of a subsequent
major depressive episode among nondepressed students (Just &
Alloy, 1997; Spasojevic ´ & Alloy, 2001) and community adults
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) as well as the severity of ongoing de-
pression in people diagnosed with depression (Kuehner & Weber,
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Furthermore, experimental studies
have found that rumination plays a causal role in the exacerbation
of negative affect and negative cognition. Compared with distrac-
tion, rumination exacerbates dysphoric mood, increases negative
thinking, and impairs social problem solving, although this effect
is only found for participants already in a dysphoric mood prior to
the rumination manipulation (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993).
Consistent with the hypothesis that rumination is a stable, trait-
like characteristic, Roberts, Gilboa, and Gotlib (1998) found that
previously dysphoric students had higher levels of rumination than
did never-dysphoric students, suggesting that rumination is not
merely a concomitant of depressed mood. Furthermore, test–retest
correlations for the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ), the
principal self-report measure of the ruminative response style, in
adult samples over periods up to 1 year are typically greater than
.60 (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994), indicating a reason-
able degree of stability. However, not all studies have found such
good test–retest reliability. Studies utilizing clinically depressed
samples tend to find moderate to poor stability (e.g., .50 across 1
year for students experiencing major depressive episodes, Just &
Alloy, 1997; .36 across 6 months for depressed students, Kasch,
Klein, & Lara, 2001). Additionally, Kasch et al. (2001) found that
participants who recovered from the depressive episode showed
significant reductions in rumination.
Furthermore, there are several important limitations of prospec-
tive studies that use test–retest assessment of the RSQ to assess the
stability of rumination. First, Fraley and Roberts (2005) warn that
test–retest reliability coefficients are not sufficient indicators of the
trait-like properties of a construct because they cannot assess
dynamic change over time. Thus, a high test–retest coefficient for
a rumination measure over two assessments is uninformative about
the extent to which rumination fluctuates over time between the
two assessments. Moreover, although RST proposes that a ten-
dency to ruminate is a stable personality characteristic, one would
expect actual engagement in ruminative thinking to exhibit vari-
ability from moment to moment over the day.
Second, a particular limitation of the RSQ is that it requires
participants to make retrospective reports on their responses to
depressed mood. Such retrospective assessment is known to be
vulnerable to bias and distortion (Stone et al., 1998).
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investigate how ruminative thinking occurs moment by moment in
real-life, real-time settings. Because ruminative thought is an on-
going dynamic process that fluctuates over time, it is critical to
examine how it is manifest in everyday contexts and settings, most
particularly in response to real emotional experiences as they
happen. Retrospective reports are unlikely to be informative about
the time course of a ruminative episode and its temporal relation-
ship to mood fluctuations. Such real-world, real-time sampling is
also necessary in order to assess whether the association between
ruminative thinking and negative mood reported in prospective
and experimental studies can be replicated in more ecologically
valid settings.
Only a few studies have attempted to track the relationship
between ruminative thought and mood over multiple time points.
A diary study by Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson
(1993) in which students recorded their responses to depressed
moods using a daily checklist found that 83% of participants were
consistent in the strategies used when experiencing depressed
mood. Ruminative responding was associated with longer periods
of depressed mood and was highly correlated with RSQ score.
Using the same daily checklist, Young and Azam (2003) reported
that the extent to which persons with seasonal affective disorder
ruminated on sad mood during the fall predicted the severity of
their depressed mood in the following winter, controlling for prior
depressive severity. Finally, Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone, and
Rachmiel (1990) asked men to report daily on their negative mood
and the extent to which they ruminated about the “most bother-
some” event of that day. Rumination was positively correlated
with negative mood, at both the within-person and between-person
levels. These results are broadly consistent with RST.
Although a methodological improvement on test–retest ques-
tionnaire studies because response styles were assessed on multi-
ple occasions, these diary studies have a number of limitations.
First, they only assessed rumination daily, typically at the end of
the day, rather than randomly sampling in real time at the
occasion-level throughout the day. This means that the assessment
involved retrospective reporting of rumination and mood and was
therefore still prone to retrospective reporting biases (Stone et al.,
1998). Second, this assessment method cannot detect contingen-
cies between events of which participants are unaware, nor allow
for analysis of the time course and interrelationship of mood and
rumination across time and across different contexts.
Thus, as suggested by Roberts et al. (1998), research on rumi-
native thinking would benefit from the use of a more naturalistic
method that enables individuals to report their thoughts and feel-
ings as they occur. Experience sampling methodology (ESM;
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987), also known as ecological mo-
mentary assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994), asks persons to
report on subjective (and objective) states as they occur at various
times over the day and circumvents many of the pitfalls of retro-
spective reports.
Silk, Steinberg, and Morris (2003) used an ESM design to
examine the mood regulation strategies of adolescents. Participants
were sampled 48 times over 1 week and asked to rate their most
negative experience over the last hour, the mood regulation strat-
egies they used, and their current affect. Hierarchical linear mod-
eling (HLM) revealed that involuntary engagement (defined as
either rumination or impulsive, involuntary action following neg-
ative events) was associated with greater sadness and anger at the
subsequent assessment. Greater use of involuntary engagement
strategies over the week was also associated with more depressive
symptomatology. However, conclusions from this study are lim-
ited by the fact that rumination was not a necessary component of
involuntary engagement and because the reporting of rumination
was largely retrospective.
Therefore, in the current study, we took advantage of an ESM
design to explicitly examine ruminative self-focus with the aim of
building on and extending the previous research on rumination.
Our objectives were to examine (a) the extent to which ruminative
thought varies over time for individuals across a broad range of
everyday situations, and (b) the concurrent and prospective rela-
tionship between occasion-level ruminative self-focus and nega-
tive affect. A unique strength of our design was that it minimized
retrospective bias by asking participants to rate their ruminative
self-focus and affect in real time at a randomly chosen particular
moment, rather than over a longer duration. This assessment
permits a more precise and immediate analysis of the relationship
between ruminative self-focus and negative affect. Unlike most
previous studies, we assessed ruminative self-focus independently
of concurrent affect, thereby measuring its variability across a
broad range of settings. This allowed us to investigate whether
individuals reporting a dispositional ruminative response style
have generally higher levels of ruminative self-focus in everyday
life. It is important to note the distinction between a ruminative
response style as a stable tendency and ruminative self-focus as a
momentary behavior that varies from one time to another. Thus,
although high ruminators may report higher average levels of
ruminative self-focus than do low ruminators, individuals are
likely to show considerable variability from one moment to an-
other.
We operationalized occasion-level ruminative self-focus using a
composite measure comprising two distinct but related items.
Consistent with the RST conceptualization of rumination as in-
volving focus on symptoms and feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991),
one item asked participants to rate the extent to which they were
focusing on their feelings. Consistent with discrepancy-reduction
accounts that implicate rumination as a response to unresolved
goals and problems (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Martin & Tesser,
1996), a second item asked participants to rate the extent to which
they were focusing on their problems. This second item is also
consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) definition, given that
past and current problems are a likely cause of depressed mood.
Think-aloud protocols reveal that rumination inductions result in
increased problem-related thought for dysphoric students
(Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). We called our two-item composite
“ruminative self-focus” because it addressed momentary self-focus
regardless of current affect, allowing us to examine the relation-
ship between ruminative thinking and negative affect over a broad
range of contexts and situations. An advantage of our items de-
rived from their simplicity: Participants reported on their focus of
attention rather than on making the more complicated metacogni-
tive judgments required by other rumination measures.
We operationalized negative affect using a simple three-item
measure asking participants to report their feelings of sadness,
anxiety, and irritation, each of which has been associated with
rumination. For example, longitudinal studies have indicated that
ruminative responses predict anxiety as well as depression (Nolen-
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studies have found that rumination inductions exacerbate anxiety
(Blagden & Craske, 1996) and anger (Rusting & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998). By using face valid, readily comprehensible
items (cf. Marco & Suls, 1993; Silk et al., 2003), we hoped to
reduce participant burden during the sampling period.
Finally, by using multilevel modeling (Snijders & Bosker,
1999), we investigated whether person-level measures of depres-
sive symptomatology (Beck Depression Inventory—II [BDI–II];
Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and dispositional rumination (RSQ)
were associated with mean levels of negative affect and ruminative
self-focus. This method also allowed us to investigate possible
interactions between person-level and momentary variables, for
example, whether momentary ruminative self-focus was more
strongly associated with negative affect for individuals scoring
highly on the BDI–II, as suggested by RST. We examined the full
Ruminative Responses Scale, including its Brooding and Reflec-
tion subscales, as person-level variables, given the evidence that
only the Brooding subscale is prospectively associated with de-
pressed mood (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
We tested four hypotheses derived from RST (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). First, consistent with the notion of rumination
as a personality trait, we predicted that there would be some
consistency in ruminative self-focus across occasions. However,
this consistency was not expected to be large because of the
variability with which this tendency is expressed in momentary
behavior. Second, because the RSQ predicts ruminative thinking
on a day-to-day basis (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993), we hypoth-
esized that the RSQ (and its Brooding and Reflection subscales)
would predict mean levels of momentary ruminative self-focus,
independently of depressive symptomatology. Third, given that
rumination and negative affect are typically correlated (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1994) and that rumination is associated with
negative affect on a day-to-day basis (Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, et
al., 1990), we hypothesized that momentary ruminative self-focus
would be associated with higher levels of concurrent negative
affect. Fourth, because RST proposes that ruminative thinking
prolongs and exacerbates negative affect, we hypothesized that
ruminative self-focus would predict negative affect at a subsequent
sampling occasion after controlling for initial levels of negative
affect. By testing the final hypothesis using a cross-lagged analy-
sis, we could simultaneously also investigate whether negative
affect predicts ruminative self-focus at a subsequent sampling
occasion after controlling for initial levels of ruminative self-focus.
Although few studies have investigated this pathway, one longi-
tudinal study of community adults revealed that depressive symp-
toms predicted increased rumination 1 year later after controlling
for initial levels of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Gray-
son, 1999).
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Exeter and
the local area using e-mails and newspaper advertisements. Each
advertisement described the study procedure and requested volun-
teers both who were and were not prone to sad moods and
depression. We recruited participants with a wide range of depres-
sive symptomatology, providing greater power to investigate the
role of ruminative self-focus for individuals reporting high versus
low levels of depressive symptoms. All respondents were invited
to take part regardless of their BDI score. This approach resulted
in a final analyzed sample with a range of scores on the BDI–II
(M  13.4, SD  9.2, range  0–41; symptom ranges: minimal
depression, n  54; mild depression, n  21; moderate depression,
n  9; severe depression, n  9). One hundred and eight persons
(76 women) consented to take part (age range  18–67 years;
M  26.3, SD  13.3).
1 Participants were paid £10 (US$20) for
completing the ESM week and received a report summarizing their
personal results some weeks later.
Procedure
We used ESM (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) to assess
negative affect and ruminative self-focus eight times daily in
naturalistic settings over 7 days, using a signal-contingent method
whereby participants rated their affect and self-focus when sig-
naled by an alarm from a wrist-worn Actiwatch (Cambridge Neu-
rotechnology Ltd., Cambridge, UK). A time-stratified random
sampling strategy was adopted so that, for each participant, each
day was divided into eight equal periods with one alarm occurring
at a random time within each period, with the constraint that
successive alarms could not occur within 15 min. This resulted in
a 12-hr daily sampling period with one alarm occurring within
each of eight 90-min periods (e.g., 1000 to 2200). Times were
individually randomized for each participant to fit in with his or
her typical waking hours (actual range: 0700–2359).
During a briefing session, informed consent was obtained and
baseline measures of dispositional rumination and depressive symp-
toms were administered. The ESM procedure was then explained and
practiced. The experimenter gave the Actiwatch to the participant,
explained the meaning of each prompt, and demonstrated how each
rating could be made in response to a hypothetical beep. It was
stressed that all ratings should be made with reference to the moment
just before the Actiwatch beeped. When the participant indicated that
he or she fully understood the procedure, the participant specified a
preferred 12-hr sampling period, which was used to configure the
Actiwatch. Finally, the participant was given the Actiwatch and a card
on which the prompts and their corresponding questions were printed.
Participants were told to carry this card on their person for reference
while wearing the Actiwatch.
At each beep, a flashing letter on an LED display prompted
participants to enter a rating about their affect or ruminative
self-focus in the moment just before the beep by pressing a button
on the Actiwatch to cycle through ratings from 1 to 7. After each
rating was entered, the next letter was displayed, prompting the
participant for the next rating. The Actiwatch only accepted entries
within 20 s of the alarm, ensuring that all data were entered
promptly and preventing the possibility of retrospective ratings.
The items rated at each beep (prompt letter in parentheses) were
sadness (S), anxiety (N), irritation (I), focus on feelings (F), and
focus on problems (P). Participants rated themselves on each of
1 The small proportion of males in our sample resulted in low power to
detect effects of gender and so this variable was not included in the main
analyses.
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(very much).
Completion rates were generally good. Eleven participants with-
drew from the study during the week of experience sampling (n 
7, ESM was too time-consuming; n  2, Actiwatch malfunctioned;
n  1, family emergency; n  1, experienced ESM as upsetting).
In accordance with standard guidelines (Delespaul, 1995), a fur-
ther 4 participants who responded to less than one third of the
signals were considered noncompleters and excluded from the
analysis. Noncompleters did not differ from completers on the BDI
or the RSQ. Ninety-three participants (67 women) were included
in the analysis (age range  18–67 years; M  26.2, SD  13.5).
Four occasions when responses of 1 were entered for every rating
were identified as multivariate outliers and deleted from the data-
set on the assumption that they represented occasions when par-
ticipants had pressed the button to stop the alarm.
The mean response rate to the watch signals was 77% (SD 
13%), representing good responding for studies using electronic
recording devices (Christensen, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Lebo, &
Kaschub, 2003). Only 3 participants responded to fewer than half
of the Actiwatch beeps. Across participants, ratings for 3,992
occasions were recorded.
We calculated a composite measure of occasion-level negative
affect by standardizing each of the sad, anxious, and irritated ESM
ratings across beeps and persons before summing the resulting z
scores (.71). Similarly, we calculated a composite measure of
occasion-level ruminative self-focus by standardizing each of the
focus on feelings and focus on problems ESM ratings across beeps
and persons before summing the z scores (.66).
Thus, for both the negative affect and the ruminative self-focus
composite, each constituent item was weighted equally while
preserving between-person variability.
Measures
BDI–II. The BDI–II assesses levels of depressive symptom-
atology with 21 items that are rated on a scale from 0 to 3, with
higher scores reflecting more depressive symptoms (range 
0–63). Cronbach’s alpha in our sample was .91.
RSQ—Ruminative Responses Scale. Ruminative response
style was measured using the Ruminative Responses Scale of
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow’s (1991) RSQ. The RSQ measures
the extent to which individuals respond to depressed mood by
focusing on self, symptoms, and the causes and consequences of
their mood, with 22 items rated on a 4-point frequency scale.
Cronbach’s alpha in our sample was .92. Because we were inter-
ested in aspects of the RSQ that were less confounded with
depressive symptoms, we also calculated scores on the separate
Brooding (.76) and Reflection (.76) subscales identified
by Treynor et al. (2003).
Statistical Model
Our data exhibited a nested structure: Occasions (Level 1) were
nested within days (Level 2), which were nested within persons
(Level 3). For this reason, we used HLM to investigate the rela-
tionships between negative affect, rumination, and the disposi-
tional variables. HLM is an extension of the regression approach in
which multiple error terms are used to partition variance between
each level of structure in the data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). In
this way, relationships both within and between each level of
structure can be analyzed without violating standard assumptions
of independence. Multilevel models are fitted to the data using
maximum likelihood estimation, an iterative procedure that is
more efficient than ordinary least squares regression. A further
benefit of an HLM approach is that it copes well with missing and
unbalanced data. For our analyses, we used the software package
MLwiN v.2.02 (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser, 2005) with
iterative generalized least squares estimation.
We constructed random coefficient models for which the gen-
eral regression equation can be expressed as follows:
Outcomeijt  b0ij 
q1
Q
bqxqijt 
r1
R
brxri  eijt
where (Outcome)ijt is the ruminative self-focus or negative affect
score for participant i at beep t on day j. The intercept is denoted by
b0ij, whereas xqijt is an entry of momentary variable xq with corre-
sponding coefficient bq, xri is an entry of person-level variable xr with
corresponding coefficient br, and eijt is an error term. The intercept
(b0ij) was specified as randomly varying at both the day and person
levels, accounting for the fact that observations tend to be more
similar if they are (a) taken on the same day, and (b) taken from the
same person. The coefficients bq and br can be considered equivalent
to unstandardized regression coefficients in standard multiple regres-
sion. However, when entered as predictors in our analysis, momentary
ruminative self-focus and negative affect were each modeled with a
coefficient that was randomly varying at the person level. This spec-
ification allowed the relationship between each variable and the
outcome measure to differ between individuals. Autocorrelation be-
tween subsequent observations may be a problem in experience
sampling data because it can downwardly bias the standard errors of
coefficients. However, inspection of the occasion-level residuals for
each of our models revealed that the average within-person serial
correlation was of a magnitude ( |.05|) low enough to have a
negligible impact on the standard errors (F. Steele, personal commu-
nication, February 12, 2007). For this reason, we did not model an
autoregressive error structure.
The BDI–II score distribution was positively skewed, and we
therefore applied a square-root transform to normalize this vari-
able. For ease of interpretation, person-level measures (BDI–II,
RSQ) and momentary ratings of negative affect and ruminative
self-focus were each entered as continuous explanatory variables
centered on their grand mean. Time of day was converted to
fractional days and centered on the mean sampling time (1506) and
day of study was centered on Day 4. For each analysis, we
constructed parallel models using (a) the full RSQ score, and (b)
the RSQ Brooding and Reflection subscale scores.
Results
Consistency of Ruminative Self-Focus
We used multilevel modeling to test our first hypothesis that the
composite measure of ruminative self-focus would be modestly
consistent across situations. In an empty multilevel model (i.e., one
that partitions the variance at each level without including explan-
atory variables), the intraclass correlation (ICC) between persons
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randomly chosen occasions for a particular person (Snijders &
Bosker, 1999). For our data, this provides an index of the level of
consistency of ruminative self-focus within persons. The intraclass
correlation between persons was 0.34 for the ruminative self-focus
measure, indicating modest levels of consistency over time. The
majority of the variance in ruminative self-focus was within per-
sons and within days (ICC  0.57), with a small proportion of
variance between days within persons (ICC  0.09).
Next, we expanded the model to explore whether ruminative
self-focus was associated with time of day or with day of the study.
We modeled ruminative self-focus with an intercept, a linear and
quadratic time coefficient, a linear day coefficient, and random
error. There was a significant quadratic effect of time (B  2.282,
SE  0.830, p  .01) and a significant linear effect of day (B 
–0.057, SE  0.015, p  .001). This indicated that ruminative
self-focus tended to be higher in the mornings and evenings than
in midafternoon and that ruminative self-focus decreased slightly
from day to day as the week progressed. In combination, the
inclusion of the time and day coefficients significantly improved
the model fit, reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(3)  24.89, p  .001.
Association Between Dispositional Rumination and
Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus
In the next step, we tested our second hypothesis that partici-
pants’ dispositional ruminative style (RSQ) would predict mean
levels of ruminative self-focus, independently of depressive symp-
toms. Thus, the person-level variables of RSQ score and BDI–II
score were entered together to explain variability in mean levels of
ruminative self-focus.
2 Table 1 presents the results of this model.
Higher scores on the RSQ (but not on the BDI–II) were associated
with greater ruminative self-focus and the inclusion of these
person-level variables significantly improved the model fit, reduc-
tion in log-likelihood, 
2(2)  26.76, p  .001.
When the RSQ Brooding and Reflection subscales were entered
instead of the full RSQ Scale, both BDI–II and brooding (but not
reflection) were positively associated with mean levels of rumina-
tive self-focus (see Table 1). The inclusion of RSQ Brooding, RSQ
Reflection, and BDI–II resulted in a significantly improved model
fit, reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(3)  30.71, p  .001.
Thus, as hypothesized, participants’ mean levels of momentary
ruminative self-focus were positively associated with a
questionnaire-based measure of dispositional rumination (particu-
larly brooding), even after controlling for depressive symptoms.
Concurrent Ruminative Self-Focus and Negative Affect
Our third hypothesis was that momentary ruminative self-focus
would be concurrently associated with negative affect after con-
trolling for depressive symptomatology. To test this prediction, we
constructed multilevel models predicting momentary negative af-
fect from depressive symptomatology, dispositional rumination,
and momentary ruminative self-focus. We also explored whether
the relationship between ruminative self-focus and negative affect
would differ for persons reporting high versus low levels of
depressive symptomatology by testing a cross-level interaction
between these variables. As in the previous analysis, we modeled
linear and quadratic effects of time and linear effects of day.
Are depressive symptomatology, dispositional rumination, and
momentary ruminative self-focus associated with momentary neg-
ative affect? To examine the relative associations of the disposi-
tional and momentary variables with mean levels of negative
affect, we conducted a sequential multilevel regression in which
BDI–II and RSQ scores were entered simultaneously as person-
level variables in the first step, before momentary ruminative
self-focus was entered in the second step.
Both BDI–II (B  0.594, SE  0.123, p  .001) and RSQ (B 
0.036, SE  0.012, p  .01) significantly predicted mean levels of
negative affect, resulting in a significantly improved model fit,
reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(2)  53.52, p  .001. In the second
step, momentary ruminative self-focus was a significant predictor
(B  0.495, SE  0.029, p  .001) of negative affect and its
inclusion significantly improved the model fit, reduction in log-
likelihood, 
2(3)  890.04, p  .001. RSQ remained a significant
predictor in the model, although the magnitude of its coefficient
was reduced (B  0.023, SE  0.010, p  .05).
In the first step of the analysis using RSQ subscales, Brooding
significantly predicted mean levels of negative affect (B  0.186,
SE  0.048, p  .001), as did BDI–II (B  0.613, SE  0.112,
p  .001), but Reflection did not (B  –0.065, SE  0.042, ns).
The inclusion of these variables resulted in a significantly im-
proved model fit, reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(3)  58.71, p 
.001. In the second step, ruminative self-focus (B  0.495, SE 
0.029, p  .001) significantly predicted negative affect, resulting
in a significantly improved model fit, reduction in log-likelihood,

2(3)  889.16, p  .001. Brooding remained a significant pre-
dictor in the model, although the magnitude of its coefficient was
reduced (B  0.126, SE  0.040, p  .01).
2 BDI–II score (square root transformed) was positively associated with
the RSQ total score (r  .55, p  .001), with RSQ Brooding (r  .46, p 
.001), and with RSQ Reflection (r  .25, p  .01). Because these variables
were correlated, we entered BDI–II and RSQ scores into the model
simultaneously. When BDI–II and RSQ were entered sequentially, RSQ
significantly improved model fit regardless of entry order but BDI–II only
significantly improved model fit when it was entered first. Results were
very similar when the RSQ Brooding and Reflection subscales were
entered together instead of the full RSQ.
Table 1
Multilevel Fixed Effects Estimates for Ruminative Self-Focus
Predictor
Model
12
BS EB S E
BDI-II 0.169 0.090 0.183 0.082
*
RSQ 0.028 0.009
** —
RSQ-B — 0.113 0.036
**
RSQ-R — 0.005 0.031
Note. Analyses include all 3,992 occasions. Models also include linear
and quadratic effects of time of day and linear effect of day. Asterisks
indicate that the coefficient differs significantly from 0. BDI-II  Beck
Depression Inventory—II (root transformed); RSQ  Ruminative Re-
sponses Scale; RSQ-B  Ruminative Responses Scale—Brooding sub-
scale; RSQ-R  Ruminative Responses Scale—Reflection subscale.
* p  .05.
** p  .01.
318 MOBERLY AND WATKINSDoes depressive symptomatology interact with momentary ru-
minative self-focus to predict momentary negative affect? In the
next step, we examined whether the association between momentary
ruminative self-focus and negative affect would differ for individuals
reporting high versus low levels of depressive symptomatology. Ac-
cording to RST, ruminative self-focus is more strongly associated
with negative affect for individuals already experiencing depressive
mood. Therefore, in a final step, we included the cross-level interac-
tion between ruminative self-focus and depressive symptomatology
(BDI–II). This interaction was statistically significant and its inclusion
significantly improved fit both for the model using total RSQ score,
reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(1)  7.36, p  .01, and for the model
using the RSQ subscales, reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(1)  6.84,
p  .01. Examination of a graph of this interaction revealed that the
positive relationship between ruminative self-focus and negative af-
fect was stronger for individuals scoring one standard deviation above
the mean on depressive symptoms than it was for individuals scoring
one standard deviation below the mean. Parameter estimates for the
final models predicting concurrent negative affect are provided in
Table 2.
These results indicate that momentary ruminative self-focus was
associated with higher levels of concurrent negative affect and
that, further supporting RST, ruminative self-focus was associated
with greater levels of negative affect for persons reporting more
severe depressive symptomatology.
3
Prospective Analysis
In our final analyses, we tested our fourth hypothesis that rumina-
tive self-focus at one occasion would predict negative affect at a
subsequent occasion after controlling for initial level of negative
affect. For this analysis, we used the sample of 2,958 occasions for
which ESM data were entered on that occasion (Time 2 [T2]) and the
immediately preceding occasion (Time 1 [T1]) within a day, entering
the time interval between occasions as a covariate. As in previous
analyses, we modeled linear and quadratic effects of time and linear
effects of day. In order to account for a possible association between
T1 negative affect and T2 ruminative self-focus, we constructed a
multivariate cross-lagged multilevel model in which T2 negative
affect and T2 ruminative self-focus were each simultaneously re-
gressed on T1 negative affect and T1 ruminative self-focus. Multi-
variate multilevel models extend the standard multilevel model
so that two or more criterion variables may be examined simul-
taneously (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999, pp. 200–206). In the
first step of this model, we simultaneously entered BDI–II score
and RSQ score (or its subscales). In the second step, we
simultaneously entered T1 negative affect and T1 ruminative
self-focus to test the cross-lagged components.
In the first step, both BDI–II (B  0.602, SE  0.124, p  .001)
and RSQ (B  0.037, SE  0.012, p  .01) were significant
predictors of mean levels of T2 negative affect. Furthermore, RSQ
(B  0.029, SE  0.009, p  .01) was a significant predictor of
mean levels of T2 ruminative self-focus but BDI–II was not (B 
0.159, SE  0.094, ns). The simultaneous inclusion of these
person-level variables resulted in a significant improvement in the
model fit, reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(4)  57.16, p  .001.
In the next step, T2 negative affect and T2 ruminative self-focus
were each simultaneously regressed on T1 negative affect and T1
ruminative self-focus with slopes that varied randomly at the
person level. Negative affect at T1 predicted negative affect at T2,
whereas ruminative self-focus at T1 predicted ruminative self-
focus at T2. Additionally, each of the cross-lagged paths was
statistically significant, indicating that negative affect and rumina-
tive self-focus were reciprocally associated over time. Thus, neg-
ative affect at T1 predicted ruminative self-focus at T2 whereas
ruminative self-focus at T1 predicted negative affect at T2. The
inclusion of the cross-lagged paths significantly improved the
model fit, reduction in log-likelihood, 
2(22)  308.83, p  .001.
Parameter estimates for this model are shown in Table 3.
Results were very similar for the model using RSQ subscales.
As did BDI–II, Brooding significantly predicted mean levels of T2
negative affect (B  0.197, SE  0.049, p  .001) and T2
ruminative self-focus (B  0.112, SE  0.037, p  .01). However,
Reflection predicted neither mean levels of T2 negative affect
(B  –0.067, SE  0.042, ns), nor mean levels of T2 ruminative
self-focus (B  0.007, SE  0.032, ns).
4
In summary, we found support for our hypothesis that momen-
tary ruminative self-focus on one occasion would predict negative
3 When negative affect at the previous occasion was included as a
covariate to partially control for any possible autocorrelation between
subsequent negative affect ratings (using a subset of the data for which
ratings were recorded at immediately subsequent occasions), the pattern of
results was identical.
4 Additional cross-lagged multivariate models predicting each of the
individual T2 negative affect items together with T2 ruminative self-focus
yielded similar results. Both cross-lagged paths were significant in the
analysis of sad affect. In the analysis of anxious affect, the path linking T1
ruminative self-focus to T2 anxiety just failed to reach statistical signifi-
cance (p  .05), whereas the other cross-lagged path was significant. In the
analysis of irritated affect, the path linking T1 irritation to T2 ruminative
self-focus narrowly failed to reach statistical significance (p  .07),
whereas the other cross-lagged path was significant.
Table 2
Multilevel Fixed Effects Estimates for Concurrent Negative
Affect
Predictor
Model
12
BS E B S E
Dispositional variables
BDI-II 0.458 0.103
*** 0.481 0.095
***
RSQ 0.023 0.010
* —
RSQ-B — 0.124 0.040**
RSQ-R — 0.056 0.034
Momentary variable
Rum 0.494 0.027
*** 0.494 0.027
***
Cross-level interaction
Rum  BDI-II 0.059 0.021
** 0.057 0.021
**
Note. Analyses include all 3,992 occasions. Model also includes linear
and quadratic effects of time of day and linear effect of day. Asterisks
indicate that the coefficient differs significantly from 0. Rum  ruminative
self-focus; BDI-II  Beck Depression Inventory-II (root transformed);
RSQ  Ruminative Responses Scale; RSQ-B  Ruminative Responses
Scale—Brooding subscale; RSQ-R  Ruminative Responses Scale—
Reflection subscale.
* p  .05.
** p  .01.
*** p  .001.
319 EXPERIENCE SAMPLING OF RUMINATION AND AFFECTaffect on a subsequent occasion, even after controlling for initial
levels of negative affect. However, we also found support for the
reverse relationship. Negative affect predicted ruminative self-
focus on a subsequent occasion after controlling for initial levels of
ruminative self-focus, suggesting a bidirectional relationship be-
tween these variables over relatively short time intervals.
5
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first explicit study of the relation-
ship between momentary ruminative self-focus and negative affect
in everyday life. This relationship was examined both concurrently
and prospectively by asking participants to record their affect and
thinking styles at random time points over one week. The present
study tested four hypotheses derived from the RST (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). First, momentary ruminative self-focus was
expected to be modestly consistent across occasions. Second,
mean levels of momentary ruminative self-focus were expected to
be positively associated with dispositional rumination. Third, ru-
minative self-focus was expected to be positively associated with
concurrent negative affect. Fourth, ruminative self-focus was ex-
pected to predict negative affect prospectively using a cross-lagged
analysis.
As expected, ruminative self-focus exhibited a limited degree of
consistency across occasions. For our composite ruminative self-
focus variable, the average correlation between any two randomly
selected occasions was .34. The finding that there was some
consistency in ruminative self-focus is in agreement with RST’s
assumption that a tendency to adopt a ruminative style is an
individual difference variable. Furthermore, as predicted by the
RST, our trait measure of ruminative response style (the RSQ)
predicted mean levels of ruminative self-focus over the sampling
week, controlling for depressive symptoms.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the magnitude of
the intraclass correlation between persons was modest and that the
within-person variability of the ruminative self-focus composite
was greater than its between-person variability. This suggests that
momentary ruminative self-focus is influenced by context, increas-
ing as feelings or problems become more salient. It should also be
noted that ratings of ruminative self-focus were collected regard-
less of simultaneous affect and so our measure is not directly
analogous to rumination as a response style to sad mood (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991).
One novel factor that this study revealed to be relevant to
ruminative self-focus is time of day. Ruminative self-focus tended
to be highest in the morning and in the evening. We speculate that
the shift in ruminative self-focus over the day may reflect the
nature of activity during a typical daily routine. Individuals may be
more likely to tune into their feelings and problems at the begin-
ning and close of the day, in order to anticipate and/or review
events. Furthermore, morning and evening tend to be quieter times
associated with less distraction and more scope for introspection
and self-focus (e.g., when lying in bed). This interpretation is
consistent with our clinical experience in that depressed patients
report that their worst bouts of rumination often occur upon
waking or going to bed. The effect of time of day on rumination
deserves further study in clinical populations.
We offer no simple explanation for our finding that ruminative
self-focus decreased slightly over the sampling week. One specu-
lation is that the process of recording details of individual in-
stances may be counter-ruminative because it acts to (a) increase
awareness of ruminative self-focus, and/or (b) interrupt bouts of
ruminative self-focus. Reactivity to ESM procedures is a poten-
tially important issue that has hitherto received little attention
(Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003).
During the everyday lives of our participants, ruminative self-
focus was strongly associated with negative affect. Though one
cannot draw causal conclusions from this relationship, this is the
first study to reveal that ruminative self-focus and negative affect
are correlated when they are measured naturalistically in real time.
Notably, this was found even though our ruminative self-focus
measure did not explicitly refer to negative mood. We also found
support for RST in that ruminative self-focus was more strongly
associated with negative affect for persons reporting high levels of
depressive symptomatology. This is congruent with laboratory
studies indicating that rumination inductions are most depresso-
genic for dysphoric individuals (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993).
Using ESM, we were able to construct cross-lagged models in
which negative affect and ruminative self-focus were predicted by
momentary variables on the preceding occasion. We found a
moderate lag for both negative affect and ruminative self-focus,
such that each variable on one occasion was correlated with the
same variable on a subsequent occasion. Controlling for these
relationships, ruminative self-focus predicted higher levels of neg-
ative affect prospectively, consistent with the predictions of RST.
The finding that questionnaire-based measures of rumination pre-
dict future negative affect and depressive symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000) is thus extended to momentary measures of
5 In a final step, we tested whether T1 ruminative self-focus interacted
with depressive symptomatology (BDI–II) to predict the T2 variables, and
whether T1 negative affect interacted with dispositional rumination (RSQ)
to predict the T2 variables. However, neither of these interaction terms
significantly improved the model fit.
Table 3
Multilevel Fixed Effects Estimates for Cross-Lagged
Multivariate Analysis
Predictor
Criterion variable
T2 NA T2 Rum
BS EBS E
Dispositional variables
BDI-II 0.386 0.083
*** 0.031 0.066
RSQ 0.023 0.008
** 0.026 0.006
***
Momentary variables
T1 NA 0.298 0.026
*** 0.085 0.020
***
T1 Rum 0.106 0.026
*** 0.174 0.026
***
Note. Analyses include 2,958 occasions. Model also includes linear and
quadratic effects of time of day, linear effect of day, and time interval
between subsequent observations. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient
differs significantly from 0. T2 NA  negative affect at Time 2; T2 Rum
 ruminative self-focus at Time 2; T1 NA  negative affect at Time 1; T1
Rum  ruminative self-focus at Time 1; BDI-II  Beck Depression
Inventory—II (root transformed); RSQ  Ruminative Responses Scale.
** p  .01.
*** p  .001.
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However, our cross-lagged analysis also revealed evidence for a
reciprocal path between negative affect and ruminative self-focus
at the subsequent occasion. This suggests that the two variables
may be related to one another in a bidirectional manner. Although
RST suggests that a ruminative response style is a predisposing
factor in negative affect and depression, these results suggest that
the microlevel relationships between ruminative thought and neg-
ative affect are reciprocal. Earlier research by Wood, Saltzberg,
and Goldsamt (1990) showed that a negative mood induction, but
not a positive mood induction, resulted in increased self-focused
attention among undergraduates (see Sedikides, 1992, for a con-
ceptual replication). As these investigators suggest, negative affect
may result in a search for explanatory causes and trigger self-
regulatory attempts to repair the negative mood and enact behav-
ioral coping strategies. The cross-lagged relationship revealed here
suggests how a downward spiral may ensue in which negative
affect and ruminative thinking lead to a progressive worsening of
mood.
When interpreting the reported relationship between negative
affect and ruminative self-focus, it is important to note that the
inclusion of time and day effects in our statistical models means
that this relationship is found after adjusting for time and day
effects. ESM data analyses that fail to account for temporal pat-
terns in key variables may yield different results, especially be-
cause the intensity of ruminative self-focus appears to follow a
curvilinear trajectory over the day.
Our results are consistent with the findings of Treynor et al.
(2003), who proposed distinct subtypes of rumination with distinct
functional effects, with brooding being more depressogenic and
reflection being less depressogenic. In the current study, the
Brooding subscale but not the Reflection subscale was strongly
correlated with mean levels of momentary ruminative self-focus.
Furthermore, brooding predicted mean levels of momentary neg-
ative affect after controlling for depressive symptomatology,
whereas reflection did not. These results complement Treynor et
al.’s (2003) finding that brooding but not reflection was associated
with more depression over time, and suggest that the tendency to
focus on self-discrepancies analytically and evaluatively may be a
uniquely harmful component of rumination (Watkins, 2004;
Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).
Although we believe that this study constitutes an important
advance in the study of ruminative self-focus and its relationship
with negative affect, we acknowledge a number of limitations.
First, our sample consisted mainly of students, so the extent to
which these results can be generalized to a broader population is
not known. Second, the demands of ESM studies mean that self-
selection biases (Scollon et al., 2003) are probable. Our partici-
pants may have been more agreeable, more conscientious, and
more rumination-prone than the wider population. Third, the short
time period available for completing the ratings may have biased
the sampled occasions to those when the participant was least
engaged in particular activities. This is true of all signal-contingent
protocols, in that there is a trade-off between maximizing the
number of sampled occasions and increasing the susceptibility to
recall bias at longer delays (Scollon et al., 2003). Because we were
measuring fluctuating affective and cognitive states that are par-
ticularly susceptible to recall bias, we considered it more important
to ensure that our reports were contemporaneous with the signal.
Fourth, the 1-week sampling period was relatively short and we
may not have captured the full range of participants’ affect and
thinking styles within this period. Longer studies may improve the
reliability of our findings and increase power to detect interaction
effects. Fifth, although participants were explicitly instructed to
make their ratings with reference to the moment immediately
before the watch beep, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
negative affect ratings influenced the subsequent ruminative self-
focus ratings after a particular signal. Thus, the rumination rating
could have been artificially inflated on occasions when partici-
pants reported higher levels of negative affect. However, this
possibility seems less likely when one considers that the “focus on
feelings” rating did not specifically address negative feelings.
Moreover, the inclusion of the “focus on problems” rating reduced
the overlap between the ruminative self-focus composite and the
negative affect ratings. Finally, it is worth noting that contamina-
tion across ratings is also possible with a reversed rating order.
Completing ratings of ruminative self-focus could influence sub-
sequent reports of negative affect. Because negative affect was our
primary outcome variable in the prospective analyses, we judged
that it was better for affect ratings to precede self-focus ratings in
order to test our hypotheses.
The operationalization of ruminative self-focus used in this
study was novel and deserves further comment. Though we believe
that our two-item composite captured key elements of a ruminative
self-focusing style, such as focus on feelings, it did not address
some aspects of rumination that have been emphasized in the
wider literature, such as its repetitive quality (Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991). Although our measure addressed the intensity of self-focus
at individual moments, it did not assess either the duration of this
thinking style or the extent to which it was repetitive. A measure
of momentary ruminative self-focus that incorporates this sense of
“stuckness” might yield stronger relationships with negative affect.
Our self-focus measure also did not tap the self-critical, evaluative
style addressed by some rumination measures (e.g., “Why do I
always react this way?” in the RSQ). Further, our composite
measure did not explicitly address ruminative self-focus as a
response to negative affect. This allowed us to investigate rumi-
native self-focus across a broad range of contexts and situations
while reducing the confounding of negative affect and rumination
that is inherent in measures such as the RSQ (Treynor et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, a challenge for future ESM research will be to
develop measures that capture diverse facets of ruminative self-
focus while minimizing the burden on participants.
Although we recruited participants with a wide range of depres-
sive symptoms, we collected no information about diagnostic
status. The observed relationship between ruminative self-focus
and negative affect may differ for a clinically depressed group.
Given that the relationship between ruminative self-focus and
negative affect was stronger for persons with higher depressive
symptomatology, it is likely that this relationship would also be
stronger for clinically depressed persons. RST proposes that rumi-
native responses are associated with greater negative affect for
individuals who are already experiencing symptoms of depression
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Further, Mor and Winquist’s (2002)
meta-analysis revealed that the relationship between self-focused
attention and negative affect was stronger in clinical groups than
for either subclinical or nonclinical groups. Finally, we speculate
that the higher levels of ruminative self-focus in clinically de-
321 EXPERIENCE SAMPLING OF RUMINATION AND AFFECTpressed individuals would yield greater levels of within-person
stability than were found in our sample.
In conclusion, this study contributes new information about the
nature and consequences of naturally occurring ruminative thought
in everyday settings. By randomly sampling the everyday experi-
ence of our participants, we found that a dispositional trait measure
of rumination is related to mean levels of ruminative self-focus, as
operationalized by focus on feelings and problems. The findings
were broadly consistent with the predictions of RST, although
there was considerable moment-by-moment variability in rumina-
tive self-focus that trait rumination could not explain. Our results
also indicated that a bidirectional relationship exists between neg-
ative affect and ruminative self-focus. Importantly, these results
complement the finding that rumination is a vulnerability factor for
negative affect, as reported in prospective longitudinal studies, and
confirm that a similar relationship is observed when ruminative
self-focus is assessed in real-time, real-world settings.
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